We are pleased to direct our readers’ attention to the book section of our website. So far, we have posted four important volumes dealing with various aspects of Srebrenica and the war in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. Three of them are our own editions. In addition, we have also posted the entire contents of the Proceedings of our international symposium on ICTY and Srebrenica and which was held in Moscow at the Russian Academy of Sciences in April of 2009.

Critical literature about what happened in Srebrenica in July of 1995 is sparse. There are quite a few books and articles of all genres on the subject, to be sure, but the emphasis here is on the word critical. The majority of the published material repeats mechanically the tired and threadbare mantras of the official story. The books that we have posted and recommend to our readers are all in one way or another products of original research and unconstrained by the brutal demands of political correctness. Also, they all ask bold questions, instead of simply replicating accepted dogmas.

When we started this site more than two years ago, we had, as a matter of course, a contact button to enable our readers to share their comments and suggestions with us. To our great disappointment, however, instead of rational comments we got – for the most part – a torrent of vituperation and abuse which was quite unpleasant to read, and even less decent to publish. So after just a few months, with regret, we decided to close down what was envisaged as a means of fruitful communication with our readers.

Dr. Alexander Mezyaev,
Head of the Department of International Law,
Law Faculty, TISBI Academy, Kazan, Russia

[This brief essay on the Krstić trial judgment by Prof. Alexander Mezyaev, a distinguished Russian legal scholar and expert on ICTY, is obviously linked to our critique of the Hague Tribunal’s fabrication of evidence, as it happens in the same case. That critique is posted in the Serbian version of this website under the title “Како Хашки трибунал производи доказе,” or: “How the Hague Tribunal fabricates its evidence.” The broad issues Prof. Mezyaev deals with in his essay are complemented by a focused analysis of the specific issue of the 6.000 Moslem POWs allegedly captured by Serbian forces by the afternoon of July 13, 1995.]

THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Thursday, July 14, 2005 COMMENT

[This 2005 comment on the tragedy of Srebrenica by General Lewis MacKenzie, written for the event’s 10th anniversary, is as relevant and accurate this year, when we are marking the 15th anniversary, as it was then. Gen. MacKenzie makes several excellent points. The first, which is anathema to all propagators of the official Srebrenica dogma, is that -- without proper regard for context – what happened in Srebrenica cannot be understood or discussed meaningfully. Secondly, he points out that the UN contingent in the enclave was miniscule, but that Moslem forces within it were sufficiently organized and equipped to conduct relentless attacks on the surrounding Serbian villages. Implicitly, the question emerges: why didn’t they offer any resistance to the Serbian forces in July of 1995 expecting, instead, the few and lightly armed UN soldiers to risk their lives for them and their families? Finally, Gen. MacKenzie makes the common sense observation that sparing women, who are the reproductive members of the supposedly targeted group, is not compatible with the intention to commit genocide, the tortuous reasoning of the Krstić chamber notwithstanding. Finally, he has the courage to state a fact known to everyone who has studied the matter: “the numbers,” as he puts it, “simply do not add up.” He could not have said it better.]

[The never implemented demilitarization of the UN protected zone in Srebrenica is a key component of the conditions which led to the dénouement of July of 1995. As shown in the text which follows, which is a chapter in the most recent monograph of Srebrenica Historical Project entitled “Srebrenica: the deconstruction of a virtual genocide”, the failure of the United Nations to ensure the demilitarization of Srebrenica, as provided in the agreement which they had signed, made it possible for the Moslem side to continue its military activities and prepared the stage for the Serbian army operation in July of 1995, with tragic consequences. Just as it is unacceptable to discuss those consequences outside the context of systematic attacks on the surrounding Serbian villages and the mass killing of their inhabitants during the preceding three years, it is equally impermissible to ignore the issue of the mandated – but never implemented – demilitarization. That is one of the factors which facilitated the continuation of those pogroms, leading to the well known reaction in July of 1995]

The issue of demilitarization of the Srebrenica protected zone is essential to a proper assessment of UN’s and, in general, international community’s, liability. The failure to implement demilitarization in the Srebrenica enclave made the commission of crimes against the non-Moslem population in the region of Srebrenica possible after the UN protected zone was set up. It is, therefore, one of the key issues that define the liability of the defendants.
The general duty of the UN to intervene on behalf of unprotected non-combatants, not just Moslem but also Serbian and other non-Moslems, is established in any event based on the prevailing norms of international humanitarian law. In this particular case, that duty is especially pronounced because—in addition to general provisions—it is also based on specific obligations arising from formal demilitarization agreements to which the UN was a contracting party. The complete failure to implement the demilitarization process for Moslem armed forces in the protected Srebrenica enclave created the key material condition which allowed Moslem forces to continue to conduct their military operations. Those military operations resulted in the human casualties and material damage to which the Writ refers.
The UN bears particular and chief responsibility for the failure to implement demilitarization.

Edward S. Herman

[The media bear immense responsibility for uncritically communicating a huge amount of misinformation and disinformation about Srebrenica. In this essay, Professor Edward Herman sets the record straight and analyzes the mechanics of the media’s failure to discharge its duty of informing the public properly on this important subject – Srebrenica Historical Project]

By the time of the “Srebrenica massacre” in July 1995 the U.S. (and British) media had already adopted what was effectively a party line on the Bosnian and other conflicts in the Balkans, according to which the Serbs were aggressors engaged in “ethnic cleansing” in the interest of a “Greater Serbia.”  This gravitation to a party line is a familiar process in the Western media, which pride themselves on their freedom, yet often behave in a manner that fits the Western model of  how media behave in a totalitarian system. Without coercion, the dominant media quickly demonize an officially targeted enemy’s leaders, use frames that support this demonization process, depend heavily on official claims, and fail to look for or report incompatible and inconvenient information. This was clearly evident in the media’s performance in the run-up to the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq in 2003, where the supposedly free and independent media swallowed the false claims about Saddam Hussein’s “weapons of mass destruction” and “threat,” which served well the propaganda needs of the war-makers.

by Edward S. Herman

It has become an annual ritual each July to commemorate the "Srebrenica massacre," which dates back to July 11-16, 1995.  The now institutionalized characterization is that "8,000 [Bosnian Muslim] men and boys" were executed by the Serbs at that time, in "the worst mass killing in Europe since the Second World War."  This memorial is attended to each year by marches and "a line of weeping relatives" (in Bosnia), interviews with the families of victims, discussion groups, conferences, and numerous media articles and statements of diplomats and political leaders recounting the story and expressing regrets at alleged UN, Dutch, and Great Power failures to prevent the killings.  This year the President of Serbia, Boris Tadic, was in attendance, showing the contrite face of the New (defeated, and supplicant) Serbia.  President Obama declared the massacre "a stain on our collective consciousness" in violation of our promise of "never again" after the Nazi atrocities of World War II, and he stated that "there can be no lasting peace without justice." [1]

The judgment delivered by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Popović et al. on June 10, 1995, is of some interest in the ongoing Srebrenica controversy. While it affirms all the principal positions of ICTY jurisprudence in this important area of the Tribunal’s judicial practice, it does so in some ways that do not follow mechanically the pattern set by its predecessor cases.

In two areas, in fact, the Popović judgment marks noteworthy departures from previous ICTY Srebrenica cases which suggests that the Tribunal has taken some account of criticisms that have been raised of its handling of key evidence used to buttress the official Srebrenica narrative. These are the method of arriving at Srebrenica death toll figures and definition of the character of the retreating 28th Division column in terms of criminal liability for the Srebrenica massacre, including the impact of its extraordinarily high casualty rate on the overall calculation of culpable deaths. But in another, equally contested area, the evidence of the so-called „crown witness“ Dražen Erdemović, the Chamber has apparently chosen to ignore compelling criticisms of his credibility and to continue the practice of its predecesors by continuing to draw important conclusions from his questionable testimony.

Just as the manuscript of our new monograph, “Srebrenica: the deconstruction of a virtual genocide”, was ready to go to press on June 10, the Hague Tribunal announced its trial verdict in Popović et al. There is always a delay before the Tribunal publishes the full text of its verdicts. As a result, what we have at this time are a few excerpts and an official Summary that was posted on the Tribunal’s website.[1]  But even that much is sufficient for some preliminary comments.

[This is a somewhat edited version of the Memorandum which Srebrenica Historical Project recently submitted to the Human Rights Committee of the European Parliament in Brussels about reconstruction and development issues that the Serbian community in Srebrenica faces.]


The memorandum that we have the honour to submit to you focuses on socio-economic and material conditions in the municipality of Srebrenica, in Bosnia and Herzegovina,  and solicits your help to increase awareness and mobilize support for overcoming the effects of ethnically discriminatory policies in the district of Srebrenica. 

А. General considerations

1. Srebrenica is a region of particular interest not only for the Republic of Srpska, but also for the international community. It has significant symbolic value as the place of intense combat between the two major communities, Serbian and Muslim, during the 1992 - 1995 conflict in Bosnia. Just as it has had a polarizing effect, it may also exhibit potential for reconciliation if the work of reconstructing homes, villages, and – most importantly – mutual trust is pursued wisely and equitably.  The record shows that both communities in Srebrenica have suffered grievously. However, due to the fact that it has been the object of continuous international attention, the Muslim community has for the most part laid successfully the foundations of a successful recovery. With regard to the Serbian community, that has not been the case at all. Neglected after the war’s end in 1995,  and virtually unrecognized as the victim of massive human and material suffering, the Serbian community has not managed to regain its equilibrium either in the political, material, or social dimensions.  While the Muslim community shows not just signs of physical revitalization, but also a lively thrust to affirm and expand its presence, the Serbian community is just hanging on – barely.